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Note: The Marcheiti Approach to Self-Incrimination
in Cases Involving Tax/Registration Statutes
I. INTRODUCTION
In the process of revenue collection, the government inevitably requires information from and about taxpayers who provide
the revenue. The satisfaction of this governmental need clashes
with the privilege against self-incrimination when the taxed activity is made illegal by nontax statutes. In 1968, the United
States Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States' held that
the privilege against self-incrimination is a complete defense to
prosecution under federal tax/registration 2 statutes when compliance would admit commission of an act which is a crime under
a nontax statute. Recently, two federal courts of appeals resolved this conflict between the government's need for information in the collection of liquor taxes and the privilege against selfincrimination in favor of the governmental interest.3 This note
will examine the developments leading to and the reasoning of
the Marchetti decision, the distinctions drawn by the two appellate courts in not applying Marchetti, and the problems resulting
from the extension of the Marchetti rationale to the liquor tax
area. It will also propose a course of action for the resolution of
this conflict between the government's need for information in
the collection of revenue and the unrestricted exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
In 1927 in United States v. Sullivan4 the United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction for willful failure to file an income tax return where the defendant claimed the privilege
against self-incrimination as a defense on the grounds that some
or all of the income had been derived from illegal activity. The
Court held the income from the illegal activity taxable and, while
1. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
2. A "tax/registration statute" is a statute or system of statutes
which provides for the payment of a tax and the simultaneous registration of the taxpayer and his taxed activity. The payment of the tax and
the registration must be contemporaneous. Except where indicated, the
cases in this note involve a tax/registration statute.
3. United States v. Reeves, 425 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Walden, 411 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1969).
4. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
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the privilege might be asserted against a specific question in an
income tax return, it could not be applied to the whole process of
filing since this "would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment . . . ."I In this way, Sullivan
resolved the conflict between the government's need for information and the privilege against self-incrimination in favor of the
governmental interest while still allowing the individual a certain degree of protection.
The Internal Revenue Act of 1951 contained provisions which
required wagerers to pay a tax and to register with the Internal
Revenue Service.6 These provisions were challenged in United
States v. Kahriger7 where petitioner raised the privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court held the privilege inapplicable because the information required in registering referred only to
"prospective acts." That is, at the time of taxation and registration there would be no incriminatory compulsion because the
criminal act would occur only after compliance with the tax/registration statute. Lewis v. United States8 presented essentially
the same issue, and the Court held that tax/registration statutes
were "wholly prospective," thereby disposing of the self-incrimination problem.
III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

A. THE Albertson

DECISION

The continued validity of Kahriger and Lewis was questioned in Albertson v. SACB. 9 There petitioners sought review
of a Subversive Activities Control Board order to register as
Communists. The Court held that the order to register violated
the privilege against self-incrimination because registration required admission of membership in the Communist Party and
"[s]uch an admission ... may be used to prosecute"' 0 under
various statutes.
5. Id. at 263-64. The Court did not elaborate but it apparently
feared that the vital self-reporting feature of the income tax system

would collapse, with drastic revenue consequences, if the privilege were
used in such a manner.
These provisions are now scat6. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3285-94 (1952).
tered throughout the Code. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401-04, 4411-13,
4421, 4901-07, 7262 (1970).

7.
8.
9.
10.

345 U.S. 22 (1953).
348 U.S. 419, 422 (1955).
382 U.S. 70 (1965).
Id. at 77.
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In Albertson the government argued that the case was analogous to Sullivan" and that the privilege against self-incrimination could be applied only to specific questions in the registration
form, not to the whole registration process. The Court, however,
ruled:
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral
on their face and directed at the public at large, but here [in
Albertson] they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners' claims are not
asserted in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of
inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's questions...
might involve petitioners in the admission of a crucial element
12
of a crime.

B.

TBi Marchetti DECISION

In light of its decision in Albertson, the Court, recognizing
the inconsistency in the Kahrigerand Lewis results, agreed to reevaluate those cases and granted certiorari in Marchettiv. United
States.'13 In Marchetti,14 the Court reversed a conviction for failure to pay a gambler's occupation tax and to register with the
Internal Revenue Service on the ground that the privilege against
self-incrimination is a complete defense to such prosecution.1 5
The Court examined the extensive federal and state anti-gambling statutes and concluded that "wagering is 'an area permeated with criminal statutes,' and those engaged in wagering are
a group 'inherently suspect of criminal activities.' "10 The Court
went on to examine and emphasize the presence of federal-state
cooperation17 and concluded that Marchetti was faced with a
11. 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (discussed in text accompanying notes 4 & 5
supra).
12. 382 U.S. at 79. (Emphasis added.)
13. 385 U.S. 1000 (1967) (granting certiorari). Commentators also
saw inconsistencies. See Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict
Between The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 103; McKay, SelfIncriminationand the New Privacy, 1967 Sup.CT. Rzv. 193.
14. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
15. In Marchetti, as in Kahriger and Lewis, there was a comprehensive federal statutory system dealing with the taxation of gamblers
involving such matters as the payment of occupation taxes, 26 U.S.C.
§ 4411 (1964); registration with the IRS, 26 U.S.C. § 4412 (1964); possession and exhibition of tax stamps, 26 U.S.C. § 6806(c) (1964); records, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4403, 4423 (1964); distribution of a list of those paying taxes to local officials, 26 U.S.C. § 6107 (1964), repealed, 82
Stat. 1235 (1968); and non-exemption from local prosecution, 26 U.S.C.
§ 4422 (1964).
16. 390 U.S. at 47.
17. Id. at 47-48. The Court noted three primary factors in its
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The Court rejected the government's proposed alternative
remedy of imposing "use restrictions" on the taxpayer-supplied
information. 20 The Court felt that it was inappropriate to frustrate congressional intent through such restrictions where Congress had manifested an intent that the taxpayer-supplied information be made available to state prosecutors. 21 Congress itself, it was said, should adopt such provisions and provide the
necessary scope of protection since Congress has the power to
22
grant protection as broad as the privilege itself.

Grosso v. United States23 and Haynes v. United States24 were
handed down together with Marchetti. Both reached the same
result. The conflict in Grosso was between the excise tax on
discussion of cooperation. First, there existed, at the time, statutory
authority to release to state prosecutors taxpayer-supplied information.
26 U.S.C. § 6107 (1964), repealed, 82 Stat. 1235 (1968). Second, it is not
uncommon for states and localities to have laws which provide that
possession of tax stamps evidencing compliance with federal tax/registration statutes is prima facie evidence of a violation of the local law
prohibiting the taxed activity. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 47-48 nn. 7-10; Kansas City v. Lee, 434 S.W.2d 481 (Mo.
1968).
See also Porter v. Scribner, 430 F.2d 1305 (10th Cir. 1970).
Finally, the Court considered the avowed federal policy of cooperation

with the states.
8

Caplin, The Gambling Business and Federal Taxes,

371, 372 (1962).
18. 390 U.S. at 48.
19. The Court rejected its prior reasoning regarding the prospective application of the tax/registration statutes. Two reasons were
given for this turnabout. First, present registration provides investigatory leads to all activity whether past, present or future; and second,
the appropriate test for application of the privilege against selfincrimination is not the chronology of events, but rather the reality of
the danger of self-incrimination. 390 U.S. at 50-54. The Court also
found that the "required records" doctrine (Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1 (1948) ) was inapplicable. 390 U.S. at 55-57.
20. "Use restrictions" means that the Court would prohibit the
federal government from transferring information supplied by taxpayers to state authorities. This remedy would permit the continued enforcement of the tax/registration statutes and still provide the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
21. 390 U.S. at 58-59. See 26 U.S.C. § 6107 (1964), repealed, 82
Stat. 1235 (1968).
22. 390 U.S. at 58, 60. Chief Justice Warren entered a vigorous dissent from Marchetti and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968),
arguing that only the section authorizing the release of taxpayer-supplied information should be declared unconstitutional and severed from
the tax/registration statute. He noted that a failure to do so frustrates
congressional intent to provide revenue with the tax/registration statute.
390 U.S. at 77-84 (dissenting opinion).
23. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
24. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
CRIME AND DEI.
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gamblers and the privilege against self-incrimination. 25 The
statutory system of excise taxes on gamblers was compared with
the occupation tax in Marchetti, and the excise taxes were found
to differ in two ways from the occupation tax. First, the excise
tax provisions required especially frequent and detailed informational filing, thereby increasing the risk of self-incrimination.2 6 Second, in the case of the excise taxes, there was no specific statutory authority for federal-state cooperation.27 However, there was no prohibition against it, and statutes of general
application had been employed as authority for such cooperation.28 In spite of these differences the Court again reached the
conclusion that there was a hazard of self-incrimination inherent
in compliance with the tax registration statute and, accordingly,
the privilege provided a complete defense.
In Haynes v. United States,2 9 the Court reversed a conviction for failure to register a firearm. The relevant statutes provided for the taxation and registration of certain peculiar firearms, such as sawed-off shotguns and machine guns, likely to be
used by individuals engaged in criminal activity.3 0 The Court
concluded that the registration program was not regulatory in
nature but aimed at an inherently suspect group. This case involved federal rather than state criminal statutes, and therefore
there was no issue of federal-state cooperation.
C. THE Two-STP INQUIRY
The rule developed in Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes attempts to alleviate the dilemma faced by a defendant in either
risking sanction for noncompliance with a tax/registration statute or incriminating himself under a nonregulatory criminal statute.
From the Marchetti line of cases, it appears that the Court,
in determining whether to apply the Marchetti rationale, will
25. Grosso had been indicted under both the occupation and
excise tax provisions, but he had not asserted the privilege against
self-incrimination as a defense to the occupation tax since Kahriger
and Lewis prevented it. Grosso had consistently urged that the privilege should protect him as far as the exise tax provisions were concerned. The attack on that tax is the primary thrust of the decision.
26. 390 U.S. at 65.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Id.
29. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
30. Id. at 87 n.4.
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look to four factors, which merge into a two-step inquiry. The
first step looks to one particular factor: the cooperation between federal and state or among federal authorities in the use of
taxpayer-supplied information required by the tax/registration
statute. The second step looks to three factors derived from language in Albertson: 31 (1) whether the tax/registration statute is
in "an area permeated with criminal statutes;" (2) whether it applies to a select group suspected of criminal activity; and (3)
whether it has an effect on an activity in an area which is not
essentially "regulatory" (as contrasted with criminal) in nature.
If the factors in both steps are present the privilege is available.
1.

Cooperation

In the application of the Marchetti rationale, courts have
distinguished between specific cooperation in fact and a general
statutory policy or continuing practice of cooperation. It appears
that it is unnecessary for the defendant to establish specific cooperation in fact to avail himself of the privilege. In Marchetti
specific cooperation between federal and state officials was required by statute. 32 There was also cooperation in fact since
Marchetti had been apprehended through the efforts of a federal
undercover agent working in concert with local law enforcement
officers. 33 In Grosso there was neither specific statutory authority for federal-state cooperation nor any proof of actual specific
cooperation but only testimony of a general practice of cooperation.34 The Court nevertheless found the existence of a general
policy or practice of cooperation sufficient to meet the requirement. Such a standard in a defense for noncompliance with a
tax/registration statute makes sense since it is difficult to see
how a defendant who had not registered could show actual cooperation in his case, whereas he could demonstrate a practice of
cooperation between federal and state officials in similar cases
where there had been actual compliance with the information requirements of the tax/registration statute.
31.
32.

382 U.S. at 79. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
26 U.S.C. § 6107 (1964), repealed, 82 Stat. 1235 (1968).

The

legislative response to Marchetti was repeal of this provision. The legislative history of the repealing act suggests that Congress intended to
make it clear that "it is not the desire or intent of the Congress that the
entire system of Federal taxation be rendered impotent or ineffectual
because a State or local jurisdiction has a law rendering aspects of the
[taxed] activity illegal." S. REP. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1968).
33.

United States v. Costello, 325 F.2d 848, 850 (2d Cir. 1965).

34. United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 1966).
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2. The Albertson Characteristics
The dimensions of the second step of the Marchetti two-step
inquiry were determined in the leading post-Marchetti cases. In
Marchetti and Grosso, the Court looked only to the first and second factors. Finding that the tax/registration statute was in an
area permeated with criminal statutes and that it was aimed at
a select group suspected of criminal activity, the Court concluded
35
In
that there was a substantial risk of self-incrimination.
Haynes the process was somewhat different. The Court began
by observing that the tax/registration statute had a crime suppression motive rather than a regulatory purpose. From this it
was concluded that the statute was aimed at a select group suspected of criminal activity (factor two), thereby creating the substantial risk of self-incrimination." Thus, both the Haynes approach and that of Marchetti and Grosso ultimately reach the
central problem in these cases, the presence of a substantial risk
of self-incrimination.
On the basis of the Court's approach to the three Albertson
factors in the Marchetti case, it appears appropriate to consider
them conjunctively in recognition of their inherent interdependence rather than as separate and individually sufficient elements. Moreover, there are two approaches that have been taken
in considering these factors as interdependent. The first (that of
Marchetti and Grosso) looks to whether the first and second factors37 are present and point to the conclusion that there is a risk
of self-incrimination. The second method (that of Haynes) looks
to the regulatory purpose of the tax/registration statute (factor
three). If the purpose is primarily to be crime suppression, the
statute is necessarily aimed at a suspect group and the crucial
risk of self-incrimination is present. Whether the approach is
that of Marchetti and Grosso or that of Haynes, the ultimate consideration in the process is this risk of self-incrimination.
It appears then from the Marchetti line of cases that there
has emerged a two step test for applying the rationale. The first
step is to satisfy the requirement of cooperation. Second, using
either of the two methods described above, the Court looks to the
three characteristics of the second step conjunctively. If both
35. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968); Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64 (1968).
36.

Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96 (1968).

37. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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steps are satisfied, the privilege against self-incrimination arising
from the threat of nontax criminal statutes is available as a defense to prosecution for violation of the tax/registration statute.

D.

SUBSEQUENT CASE DEVELOPMENTS

There have been several applications of the Marchetti rationale in the areas of gambling, narcotics, liquor and firearms. In
addition to developments in these specific areas, it has been held
generally that the rationale does not protect those whose registration with the Internal Revenue Service38 contains false information, and is not to be applied retroactively in criminal
30
cases.
1.

Gamblers

Lower courts have consistently applied Marchetti in prosecutions for noncompliance with tax/registration requirements for
gamblers. 40 Since these decisions seem to have successfully precluded such prosecutions in the future, imaginative methods of
applying the doctrine are constantly attempted. Relying on
Marchetti, some gamblers on trial in state courts have attempted
unsuccessfully to obtain federal injunctions against federal agents
to prevent them from testifying at state trials. 41 Such evidence
2
gathered by federal agents has been excluded in Pennsylvania
but has been allowed in Missouri.43 Efforts have been made to
suppress evidence in post-Marchetti prosecutions under local
statutes when such evidence was obtained through warrants
validly issued prior to Marchetti on the basis of probable cause
for violation of the gamblers' occupational tax statute. Courts
38. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969).

39. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971). See note 40
infra.
40. See, e.g., Scaglione v. United States, 396 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968).
One of the most interesting developments in the application of the
Marchetti rationale to gambling cases has occurred in forfeiture proceedings (civil) against gamblers. While the Sixth Circuit has held that

Marchetti does not preclude civil forfeiture of gambling paraphernalia
since the civil liability for taxes remains (United States v. One 1965
Buick, 392 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1968)), the United States Supreme Court

has taken the view of the Seventh Circuit, that there may be no civil
forfeiture since this is an indirect punishment of something Marchetti
prevents from being punished directly. United States v. U.S. Coin and
Currency, 393 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1968), affd, 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
41. Rainery v. United States, 423 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1970); United

States v. Boiardo, 408 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1969).
42.

43.

Commonwealth v. Bykowski, 429 Pa. 406, 240 A.2d 809 (1968).

State v. Sellaro, 448 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1969).
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have rejected this argument. If the warrant was valid when
44
issued the evidence is not tainted.
2. Narcotics
The development of the Marchetti rationale in the narcotics
area was slow until Leary v. United States.4 5 There the Court
applied Marchetti to possessors of narcotics and used the Haynes
approach to the Albertson factors. 4" But in Minor v. United
States47 the rationale was not applied to a seller of narcotics who
challenged, as contrary to the privilege, the appearance of the
seller's name on the order form required by statute48 to be presented to him by the purchaser of the narcotic. The Minor
court found the privilege inapplicable since "[t] here is no real
and substantial possibility that the ...
order form requirement will in any way incriminate sellers for the simple reason
that sellers will seldom, if ever, be confronted with an unregistered purchaser who is willing and able to secure the order
form".49 This distinction between possessors and sellers of narcotics has been followed by the lower courts in the application of
the Marchetti rationale in the narcotics area. 0
3. Firearms
Subsequent cases in the firearms area have been concerned
not with the registration statute, 51 as was Haynes, but with a tax
statute52 which requires the filing of a statement of intention of
any person intending to make a firearm. Despite the fact
that persons engaged in the business of manufacturing firearms
are exempted from this filing requirement,5 3 which suggests that
it is in fact aimed at a select, suspect group, the majority of the
circuits have held that the defense based on the privilege against
44. United States v. Hanon, 428 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Tiktin, 427 F.2d 1027 (6th Cir. 1970).
45. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
46. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
47. 396 U.S. 87 (1969).
48. 26 U.S.C. § 4742 (a) (1964), repealed, 84 Stat. 1292 (1970).
49. 396 U.S. at 93.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 428 F.2d 211 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970): Alverez v. United States, 426 F.2d 301 (5th
Cir. 1970).
51. 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1954) requires every person "possessing a
firearm" to register.
52. 26 U.S.C. § 5821 (1954).
53. 26 U.S.C. § 5821(b) (1971).
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self-incrimination is unavailable. 5' These courts have reasoned
that unlike Haynes, where the registration statute and the criminal statute 56 were said to be aimed at identical activity, here
the activity required to be registered is not illegal under criminal
statute. In 1968 Congress imposed restrictions on the use of tax
information for prosecution purposes,5 7 which should alleviate
the many problems of self-incrimination which have plagued
the firearms acts.
4. Liquor
The fourth area of judicial development of the Marchetti rationale is that of liquor tax/registration statutes. Three major
types of tax/registration statutes have been attacked in the liquor regulation area: possession of untaxed liquor statutes, distilling operations statutes and retail liquor sales laws.
The several attempts to apply the Marchetti rationale to
cases involving illegal possession of liquor on which tax has not
been paid have been singularly unsuccessful because they do not
involve a true tax/registration statute. There is no statutory
registration requirement.5 "
Attempts have also been made to apply the Marchetti rationale to tax/registration statutes dealing with the distilling process
itself. Here, in order to comply with a state tax statute"0 a distiller must register, thereby often admitting violation of a state
criminal statute prohibiting the activity of distilling.6 0 A comparison of the reasoning in two distilling cases, United States v.
McGee6 ' and United States v. Fine,62 is interesting because the
54. See, e.g., Desimone v. United States, 423 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1970); United States v. Benner, 417 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Davis, 313 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1970). But see DePugh v.
United States, 401 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1954).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 5851 (1954).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 5848 (1971).
58. Wilson v. United States, 409 F.2d 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 923 (1969); Shoffeitt v. United States, 403 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969).
59. Examples of such statutes in federal law are: 26 U.S.C. §§
5173, 5601(a) (4) (1967) (requires the posting of a bond); 26 U.S.C. §§
5222, 5601(a) (1967) (requires the registration of distilleries). The purpose of the bond, among other things, is to insure the collection of taxes
on liquor. 26 U.S.C. § 5173 (1967).
60. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18-28, 18-31, 18-35 (1965); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 57-101 et seq. (1968).
61. 282 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
62. 293 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Tenn. 1968). Fine is the only reported
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cases involved the same statutes yet reached opposite results. In
both cases, the defendants were indicted for failure to register
their distilleries, an illegal business under local law. 3 In McGee
a motion to dismiss based on Marchetti was denied. The court
briefly reviewed Albertson and the leading cases following Marchetti and concluded, in line with long standing precedent,6 4 that
the tax/registration statutes were regulatory (factor three) and
that distillers are not a select group since the tax/registration
statute was aimed at an entire industry (factor two).*O5 The court
therefore held the Marchetti rationale inapplicable. The McGee
court's approach was that used in Haynes. 0 However, the court
did not mention the risk of self-incrimination. This is perhaps
explained by its conclusion that the three Albertson factors were
67
not satisfied.
Both the result and the approach of the Fine court were opposite to those of McGee. The Fine court looked first to the permeation factor as evidenced by local criminal statutes', while the
McGee court essentially disregarded this factor. The Fine court
concluded that the tax/registration statute was in a permeated
area (factor one) and since that area was permeated with criminal statutes there was a select group (factor two).C9 It then went
on to explain why there existed a risk of self-incrimination.
While aware. of the McGee precedent and its emphasis on the
regulatory nature of the tax/registration statute, the Fine court
dismissed this factor in a footnote. 0 Having concluded that the
Albertson factors were present, the Fine court went on to find
cooperation. This was easy since Fine had been apprehended
simultaneously by state and federal authorities.
Other cases, employing a somewhat different

approach,

case which applied the Marchetti rationale to the liquor tax/registration
statutes but there is one unreported case which has done so (United
States v. Lackey, Crim. No. 6979 (E.D. Tenn. 1968)) which is discussed
in Powell & Jones, Self-Incrimination and FairPlay-Marchetti,Grosso
and Haynes Examined, 18 AM. U. L. Rv. 114, 136 (1968). The discussion does not, however, explain the complete reasoning for the application of Marchetti.
63. TEN. CODE ANN. § 57-101 et seq. (1968).
64. See discussion of United States v. Ulrici in note 79 infra.
65. See text following note 31 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
67. United States v. Richardson, 284 F. Supp. 419 (M.D. Ala. 1968),
is in accord with McGee.
68. TENN. COD AN. § 57-101 et seq. (1968).
69. 293 F. Supp. at 192. See text following note 31 supra.
70. 293 F. Supp. at 192 n.4.
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have concluded that Marchetti is simply inapplicable to the
liquor tax area.71 United States v. Walden72 and United States v.
Reeves 73 are examples of such cases resolving the conflict in favor of the governmental need for revenue. Although involving
different statutes, both cases employ similar reasons in reaching
identical results.
In United States v. Walden 74 the defendant was a distiller,
and therefore engaged in activity illegal under local law, 7 , who
failed to comply with the requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code. 76 Evidence of his activity was gathered by the state prosecuting officials. The Fourth Circuit held the Marchetti rationale inapplicable to the liquor area. The court's approach to the
Albertson factors was to consider the factors separately as independent elements. The "permeation" factor (factor one) was
77
of
found not present because distilling is "not almost certain"
being illegal in most jurisdictions. Moreover, the tax/registration statute in the liquor area was said to be aimed at many
rather than few people (factor two) " However, the Walden
court addressed itself primarily to factor three, finding the purpose of the statutes to be solely regulatory.7 9 In addition, per71.

In addition to the cases discussed in the text there have been

two other important decisions at the circuit court level which have held
that the Marchetti rationale does not apply to the liquor tax/registration area. But, as opposed to the cases discussed in the text, these other
cases arose in jurisdictions in which the taxed activity was not illegal.
Accordingly it was not possible, under the Marchetti rationale, for
there to be any risk of self-incrimination. However, these other cases
did go on to reflect much of the other thinking expressed in the cases

discussed in the text. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 424 F.2d 446
(6th Cir. 1970) (distilling a legal operation in Michigan); United
States v. Hunt, 419 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016

(1970) (distilling not illegal per se in New Jersey).
72.
73.

411 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 931 (1969).
303 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1063 (10th

Cir. 1970).

74. 411 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1969).
75. N.C. GEN.STAT. §§ 18-28, 18-31, 18-35 (1965).
76. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5173, 5601 (a) (4), 5222, 5601 (a) (1967).
77. 411 F.2d at 1111.
78. Id. The Walden court pointed to the number of individuals
who complied with the distilled spirits registration requirements to
support the refutation of the presence of the "selective group" factor.
Id. at n.3.
79. The Supreme Court had long since reached the same conclusion in United States v. Ulrici, 111 U.S. 38 (1884):
It is clear, even upon a cursory reading, that the well-considered and minute provisions of [the liquor tax statutes] were
adopted with one purpose only, namely, to secure the payment
of the tax imposed by law upon distilled spirits.
111 U.S. at 40.
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haps in recognition of the Haynes approach, 80 the court found
that the tax/registration statutes were not intended to force selfincrimination.8 ' Although the court found that the three Albertson factors were not satisfied it nevertheless went on to examine
the question of cooperation. Here there had been no actual
specific cooperation nor had the defendant shown the existence
82
of a general practice based on specific congressional intent.
In United States v. Reeves,8 3 the defendant sold liquor in violation of local law84 and neglected to pay the occupation tax

on that activity in violation of federal law.8 5 The facts do not
disclose the existence of either general or specific cooperation.
The trial court" denied a motion to apply Marchetti, reasoning
like the Walden court with regard to the Albertson factors. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed, 87 basing its opinion primarily upon the
regulatory aspects of the tax/registration statutes involved and
using Walden as an indication of a trend toward not applying
Marchetti in the liquor tax area.8 8 Reeves is the only case to
date to consider the impact of the repeal of the specific statutory authorization for cooperation between state and federal authorities which the Marchetti court found objectionable. The
Reeves court, without explanation, concluded that the repeal
eliminated the problem of specific statutory cooperation.
80. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. The court, as had the
Haynes court, balanced the governmental need for information against

the privilege in favor of the government, noting that "the Supreme

Court appears thus far to have resolved this conflict in favor of satisfying the governmental interests unless a statutory request for information affirmatively contemplates and seeks self-incrimination of the class
to whom the request is directed." 411 F.2d at 1114-15.
81. 411 F.2d at 1112, 1114-15. To support this conclusion, the
court compared the revenue generated by the liquor taxes ($3.7 billion) in 1966 with that obtained over several years under the occupational gambler's tax ($115 million). 411 F.2d at 1112. It then cited
Chief Justice Warren's interesting dissent in Marchetti, where the Chief

Justice justified the tax in question by noting the revenue collected.
These figures were used in Walden to indicate the insignificance of the
amount of revenue generated by the gamblers' tax.

82. 411 F.2d at 1112.
83. 303 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Okla. 1969), affd, 425 F.2d 1063 (10th
Cir. 1970).
84- OKLA. Cox. art. 27; OKrA. STAT. 37 § 538(h) (1968).
85. 26 U.S.C. § 5691(a) (1970).
86. 303 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
87. 425 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1970).
88. In addition to Walden, the cases cited were: United States v.
Hunt, 419 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1969); cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016 (1970) (distilling case, discussed in note 67 supra); Wilson v. United States, 409
F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969).
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IV. ARE THE MARCHETTI CASES DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THE LIQUOR CASES?
In view of the trend of wider application of the privilege
against self-incrimination 9 and the seemingly analogous factual
situations in the Marchetti line of cases it was clearly possible
that the liquor cases might have followed the Marchetti line. In
assessing whether the liquor cases were rightly distinguished, o°
it is submitted that those courts incorrectly evaluated the three
factors of the second step in the Albertson test and incorrectly
viewed them separately rather than conjunctively.

A. Is

THE AREA PERMEATED?

The first factor to be considered is whether the liquor tax/
registration statutes are in an area "permeated" with criminal
statutes.9 ' The liquor cases distinguished Marchetti by concluding that a single local prohibition is not sufficient "permeation."
In so doing they perpetuated an ambiguity already present in Supreme Court opinions as to the number of jurisdictions in which
an activity must be illegal before it can be said that the area of
that activity is permeated with criminal statutes. While the Supreme Court in Marchetti and Grosso noted that the activity in
question was illegal in most other jurisdictions as well as the one
in which it was conducted, it stated in Albertson that the privilege protects an individual from answering questions which admit "a crucial element of a crime" (emphasis supplied)292 The
courts well might have been advised for policy reasons to adopt
a standard whereby a single local prohibition would constitute
sufficient permeation in its jurisdiction. Such a standard would
89. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S, 1 (1964); Dionisopoulos, New Dimensions To
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Supreme Court and the
Fifth Amendment, 44 Cm-KENT L. REv. 1 (1967); Friendly, The Fifth

Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN.
L. REV. 671 (1968); Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Government's Need
For Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 103; McKay, Self-Incrimination And
The New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193.
90. The Marchetti rationale was applied only in Shoffeitt v. United
States, 403 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969);
United States v. Fine, 293 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); United States

v. Lackey, Crim. No. 6979 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (discussed in note 62 supra).
91. See text following note 31 supra.
92. Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
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be quite manageable and in harmony with the purpose of the
Since the privilege was
privilege against self-incrimination. 3
designed to protect individuals, it seems appropriate to consider
the law of the jurisdiction in which the activity took place, not
that of numerous other jurisdictions. On the other hand, it
seems irrefutable that such a standard would frustrate government collection of revenue to some extent. Moreover, it would
detract from any uniformity in the administration of the tax/
registration statutes.
The liquor case courts' treatment of the permeation factor
separately from other relevant factors is an unsatisfactory approach to resolving the information-incrimination conflict. By
such insistence on treating permeation as a necessary element to
the availability of the privilege, the courts fail to consider in
all cases the risk of self-incrimination thereby ignoring the truly
relevant consideration. This tendency to give too much emphasis to factors extraneous to the availability of the privilege is further evidenced by the great emphasis given by the liquor case
courts to the frustration of revenue collection that would result from the adoption of a single local statute standard.

B. A SELECT SUSPECT GROUP
The liquor cases decided that the tax/registration statutes
were not aimed at a select group suspected of criminal activity. 9 '
They so concluded by comparing the numerically few people engaged in the activities in the Marchetti line of cases with the
large number engaged in the liquor industry.'" Support for their
conclusion was drawn from the number of people who comply
with the tax/registration statute and the amount of revenue it
generates. 9 6 This approach seems unacceptable because the
question of whether the congressional motive was to combat
crime or merely to provide a sanction for noncompliance with the
registration Statute is thereby determined solely on the basis of
the number of people engaged in the relevant activity.
This deficiency is aggravated by the liquor case courts' view
of this select group factor as an independent one. In placing
93. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-16
(1966); McKay, supra note 89, 213-14.
94. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
95.

See text accompanying note 78 supra.

96. See note 81 supra.
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sole emphasis on the number of people engaged in tax/registration statute activity, such factors as the presence of criminal
statutes and the attendant risk of self-incrimination are left unconsidered even though they are central to the availability of
the defense.
C.

A REGULATORY PURPOSE

The liquor case courts considered the liquor tax/registration
statutes to be regulatory in that they were adopted primarily for
the purpose of raising revenue. This was a conclusion for which
there is long standing precedent.0 7 In addition, these courts relied heavily on the lack of any authority to suggest that the statutes are intended to serve any crime suppression function.
In concluding that the Marchetti rationale does not apply,
however, the liquor case courts assumed that registration statutes
can be divided neatly into "regulatory" and "nonregulatory"
categories.98 As one commentator recently noted, 9 the statutes
will not admit of such clear distinctions, but do fall into three
general categories: (1) neutral tax/registration statutes, such as
the gasoline tax laws,10 0 where there is no illegality in the activity with which the tax/registration statute is concerned; (2)
criminal or inherently criminal statutes, such as the narcotics
tax statutes, where all aspects of the activity are highly illegal;
and (3) "in-between" tax/registration statutes, such as those concerned with manufacturers of vinegar, 10 ' renovated or adulterated butter, 10 2 filled cheese 0 3 and distilled spirits, where some
of the activities within the area of the tax/registration statute
are free from suspicion but others are illegal. The in-between
group of tax/registration statutes are arguably regulatory and
97.

See, e.g., United States v. Ulrici, 111 U.S. 38 (1884)

(quoted in

note 79 supra).
98. Admittedly, it appears that the Supreme Court also continues
to make this assumption. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
99. Note, Registration Statutes and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 63 Nw. U. L. Rtv. 398, 407 (1968). The author asserts that
the Marchetti rationale would be applied only to the inherently criminal group. For an interesting example of a case which may be in the
neutral category see United States v. Uhrik, 285 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Pa.
1968), where the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to apply the Marchetti rationale to information required to be submitted to the ICC.
100. 26 U.S.C. § 4081 (1970).
101. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5502, 5504 (1970).
102. 26 U.S.C. § 4821 (1970).
103. 26 U.S.C. § 4841 (1970).
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yet, due to the existence of criminal statutes prohibiting some
aspects of the regulated activity, there exists a real risk of selfincrimination. Here, then, the information-incrimination conflict is most acute.
Since this conflict is acute, it is demonstrably inadequate for
the liquor case courts to view the relevant factors independently
of each other. By deciding whether a defense grounded on the
privilege is available solely on the basis of a conclusion as to
whether the tax/registration statute is regulatory or nonregulatory, the truly relevant factors in determining the availability
of the defense are ignored (i.e., the presence of criminal statutes
and the risk of self-incrimination). These latter factors were
taken fully into account in the approach of the leading cases in
the Marchetti line. This latter approach provides the most suitable framework for balancing, on the one hand, the interests of
the government in acquiring tax information and the probability
that the Congressional motive in enacting the tax/registration
statute was not crime suppression, and, on the other hand, the interests of the individual in the protection afforded him by the
Fifth Amendment. 04 Of relevance in the balance is the notion
that Congress may not legislate away the privilege,' 0 5 especially
where there are alternative solutions to resolving the conflict.'10
Either the Marchetti-Grosso approach, which emphasizes the
existence of criminal statutes,' 07 or the Haynes approach which
emphasizes the purpose of the tax/registration statute'l0 are suitable approaches to the problem. Had either approach been taken
and the conflict set in this perspective, the liquor case courts
might not have been so swayed by the revenue consequences of
allowing the defense. 10 9

D. COOPERATION
The first step of the two-step inquiry is cooperation, gener104. McKay, supra note 89, at 213-14, has suggested that "only two
[purposes] have any great probative force, and they are perhaps
opposite sides of the same coin: (1) preservation of official morality,
and (2) preservation of individual privacy."
105. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968).
106. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See text following note 118 infra for an alternative.
107. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
109. However, the decision may have been influenced by certain
other problems. See text accompanying notes 113-16 infra.
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ally between federal and state officials.11 0 Under the current
rule in the liquor cases it appears that either a general practice
of cooperation or specific cooperation in fact is sufficient."' A
more serious problem arises where the burden of showing cooperation is placed on the defendant. This is an unrealistic burden
when one considers the often informal nature of the cooperation
between law enforcement agencies and the restricted use of depositions allowed under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." 2
While it may be argued strongly that one claiming the privilege
against self-incrimination should have the burden of showing its
application, it is perhaps more fair under the difficult circumstances in the liquor cases to lighten the defendant's burden.
V. PROBLEMS WITH EXTENSION OF THE
MARCHETTI RATIONALE AND A PROPOSAL
A.

PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL EXTENSION OF THE

Marchetti RATIONALE

As discussed above, each of the distinctions made by the
courts in the liquor cases is subject to criticism. If the three
Albertson factors were interpreted correctly and applied conjunctively, then the Marchetti rationale could be extended to
tax/registration statutes both in the liquor area and in the inbetween category. Judicial extension, however, would also create problems. First there would be diverse results in the enforcement of the liquor tax statutes in different jurisdictions. Such
results are undesirable since the government's regulatory purpose of revenue collection would be frustrated through the
loss of efficiency in enforcement. Congress has strongly indicated it does not desire and will not permit this result.' " Additionally, this diversity in enforcement might have the undesirable effect of frustrating the state's police power.
Another method of judicial extension of the Marchetti doctrine would impose use restrictions on information supplied
by taxpayers or grant immunity from local prosecution to those
110. Additionally, the test of cooperation should cover that which
flows either from the federal government to the state or vice versa.
If Marchetti provided only one-way protection, it would be an incomplete protection and the results seem ludicrous.
111. See United States v. Walden, 411 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.
1969). See also text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
112. FED. R. CRiM. P. 16. See, e.g., United States v. Battaglia, 410
F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sermon, 218 F. Supp. 871
(W.D. Mo. 1963); United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.
N.Y. 1960).
113. S. REP. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1968).
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complying with the tax/registration statutes in the in-between
category. There are several problems with this alternative.
First, in Marchetti, the dominant precedent, the Court indicated
that it was unwilling to impose such use restrictions.' 4 Second,
there is a long standing statute which provides that the payment
of such taxes shall not exempt taxpayers from prosecution under state laws." 5 Granting such immunity would deprive states
of the power to effectively define and punish criminal activity.
Finally, this emasculation of the state police power might be
compounded by an accompanying increase in the locally prohibited activity.
These problems appear to underly the refusal of the liquor
case courts to extend Marchetti. At the price of the availability
of the defense based on the privilege against self-incrimination,
these courts have weighed the balance in favor of administrative
convenience and revenue collection. However, an alternative
legislative answer to these problems might reduce the burden on
the individual and serve to better implement the purposes of
the Fifth Amendment.110
B.

LEGISLATIVE ANSWER

The Court in Marchetti" 7 and in Grosso'" invited Congress to protect the privilege against self-incrimination by enacting restrictions on the use of information collected for tax
purposes. The response was the repeal of the statute authorizing the release to state prosecutors of information supplied by
the taxpayer. This action was neutral. It removed a provision
114. 390 U.S. at 58-60.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 5145 (1970) states:
The payment of any tax imposed ... on any trade or business
shall not be held to exempt any person from any penalty or
punishment provided by the laws of any State for carrying on
such trade or business within such State, or in any manner to
authorize the commencement or continuance of such trade or
business contrary to the laws of such State or in places prohibited by municipal law; nor shall the payment of any such
tax be held to prohibit any State from placing a duty or tax on
the same trade or business, for State or other purposes.
Similar provisions have existed since 1868. See, e.g., Act of July 20,
1868, ch. 186, § 58, 15 Stat. 151.
116. For a discussion of the purposes of the privilege see McKay,
supra note 89, at 213-14. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 406, 414-16 (1966). For a criticism of the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, see Friendly, supra note 89.
117. 390 U.S. 39, 58-69 (1968). See also text accompanying note
20 supra.
118. 390 U.S. 62, 69 (1968).
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obnoxious to the Fifth Amendment but it did not provide affirmative protection. This problem could be eliminated by congressional action.
Congress should enact a statute prohibiting the transfer to
state prosecutors of information supplied by the taxpayer. If
the purpose of the various tax/registration statutes is only to
gather revenue, then there should be no objection to such a statute because there would be no effect on the revenue effort. In
addition, such a statute would be a positive indication of congressional intent to provide protection of the privilege as broad
as the privilege itself. The statute would remove the problem
of general cooperation and each case could be decided on the
basis of specific cooperation. A related advantage to such congressional action is that it would then be fair, given wider discovery provisions, to place the burden of showing cooperation on
the defendant. Arguably such a statute would encourage officials to conceal evidence of specific cooperation, making it all the
more difficult for the defendant to prove; however, the likelihood
of such governmental conduct is not so great as to preclude this
legislative solution. Other benefits from such congressional action are the assured collection of federal revenue and the enforcement of tax laws without regard to geography. Moreover,
the state police power to define and to punish criminal activity
would not be abridged.
The biggest problem with such a legislative solution is securing Congressional action. This could be hastened if the liquor
case courts were to extend the Marchetti rationale and thus call
on Congress to react as the Supreme Court did, albeit with only
partial success, in the Marchetti case itself.

